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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Supreme Court had original appellate jurisdiction of this appeal under
Utah Code section 78A-3-102(3)(j). Pursuant to its authority under Utah Code section
78A-3-102(4), the Utah Supreme Court transferred the case to this Court on July 10,
2009. This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code section 78A-4-103(2)0.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES / STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Appellee does not agree with Appellants' statements of the issues and the standard
of review. Pursuant to rule 24(b)(1) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Appellee
provides the following statements:
Issue: Where the district court's final judgment was affirmed on all issues by the
Utah Court of Appeals, did the district court correctly conclude that it lacked authority
upon remittitur to modify the final judgment?
Standard of Review: Contrary to Appellants' statement of the standard of review,
the clearly erroneous standard applies when an appellate court is reviewing questions of
fact. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935 (Utah 1994). This case does not present questions
of fact. Rather, it presents pure questions of law, as it is a review of the district court's
legal determinations.

See id. (defining legal determinations as "rules or principles

uniformly applied to persons of similar qualities and status in similar circumstances").
Accordingly, the proper standard of review is correctness. Id. at 936 ("[Ajppellate
review of a trial court's determination of the law is usually characterized by the term
'correctness.'").

1
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DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS
There are no determinative provisions.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I. NATURE OF THE CASE
This appeal is a continuation of a dispute that began in 1985, when Hi-Country
Estates Homeowners Association ("the Association") brought an action against multiple
parties to quiet title to a water system. In the nearly 25 years since the dispute began, the
Association and Rodney Dansie affiliated entities (collectively, "the Dansies") have
litigated numerous claims and counterclaims related to the water system. Not only does
this dispute have an extensive history in the district court, but it has also produced six
appellate court opinions (three in the Utah Supreme Court and three in this Court).
This appeal centers on a Final Judgment that was entered by the district court in
2006. In an attempt to end the long-running litigation between the parties, the district
court requested that the parties present all remaining issues so that a final judgment could
be entered. After extensive briefing and a trial on all remaining issues, the district court
entered its Final Judgment on January 5, 2006 ("Final Judgment").

Both parties

appealed the Final Judgment to this Court. In March 2008, this Court issued its opinion,
in which this Court "affirm[ed] the trial court on all issues."

Hi-Country Estates

Homeowners Ass'n v. Bagley & Co., 2008 UT App 105, % 24, 182 P.3d 417. The
Association filed a Petition for Rehearing with this Court, which was denied.

2
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The

Dansies did not request a rehearing.

Both parties then filed Petitions for Writ of

Certiorari with the Utah Supreme Court, which were denied. This Court then remitted
the case to the district court.
Shortly after the case was remitted to the district court, the Dansies filed a
"Motion to Modify Final Judgment." The Dansies asked the district court to significantly
change the Final Judgment based on a footnote in this Court's opinion, despite the fact
that this Court had "affirm[ed] the trial court on all issues." Id. The district court
concluded that it had no authority to modify the Final Judgment in the face of this Court's
unequivocal affirmance of the entire Final Judgment.

The Dansies now appeal the

district court's order denying the motion to modify.
II. STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW1
District Court's Final Judgment
1.

In February 2006, the parties stipulated to, and the district court certified,

all remaining issues in this longstanding dispute. (R. Vol. 13, p. 1554-55.)
2.

Following a trial on the remaining issues, the district court entered its Final

Judgment on January 5, 2006. (R. Vol. 14, p. 1764-73.)

This case has an extensive factual and procedural history going back almost 25
years. Because this appeal is narrow and relates only to the proceedings from the last few
years, this brief contains only the facts and procedural history pertinent to this appeal. If
the Court desires a more detailed history in order to understand the background of this
case, it is invited to review the statement of facts in Hi-Country Estates Homeowners
Ass'n v. Bagley & Co., 863 P.2d 1, 2-6 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) or the statement of facts
contained in the Association's brief in the most recent appeal (Appellate Docket Number
20060139). See Brief of Appellee dated March 28, 2007, pages 6-27.
3
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3.

In the Final Judgment, the district court held that "[f|he Dansies are entitled

to receive water from the Association's Water System only upon payment of the Dansies'
pro rata share of the Association's costs of power, chlorination, water testing and
transportation." (R. Vol. 14, p. 1769.) Additionally, the district court held that the
Dansies had "the right to receive 55 additional water connections from the Association,
but only if the Dansies pay the Association for those connections at the Association's
usual charge for each such connection." (R. Vol. 14, p. 1767.)
Utah Court of Appeals' Opinion
4.

Both parties appealed the Final Judgment to this Court. (Appellate Docket

Number 20060139.)
5.

In the Dansies' opening brief, the first issue presented to this Court for

review was "[w]hether the trial court erred in holding that although the Well Lease
provides that the Dansies are entitled to 55 water connections and up to 12 million
gallons of water per year without charge, the Dansies must first pay for the connections
as well as the Dansies' pro rata share of the transportation costs." (Brief of Appellants
dated January 26, 2007, page 1. A copy of this page is attached hereto as Tab A.)
6.

Much of the briefing by both parties focused on this issue. {See, e.g., Brief

of Appellants dated January 26, 2007, pages 13-18; Brief of Appellee dated March 28,
2007, pages 35-39; Reply Brief of Appellants dated June 21, 2007, pages 18-22; Reply
Brief of Appellee dated August 29, 2007, pages 2-9.)
7.

In oral argument before this Court, the first issue raised by the Dansies'

counsel was "whether or not the Dansies are required to pay the transportation costs
AQAA
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associated with the lease provision that says they're entitled to 12 million gallons of
water per year and the 55 hookups." (A recording of the oral argument is available
online at http://www.utcourts.gov/courts/appell/streams/index.cgi?mon=::200711.)
8.

On March 27, 2008, this Court issued its opinion. Hi-Country Estates

Homeowners Ass 7i v. Bagley & Co., 2008 UT App 105, 182 P.3d 417.
9.

In the opening paragraph of the opinion, this Court held that the district

court's Final Judgment was affirmed. Id. f 1 ("We affirm.").
10.

In the final paragraph of the opinion, this Court again stated that it was

affirming the district court's Final Judgment in its entirety. Id. f 24 ("We therefore
affirm the trial court on all issues.").
Petitions for Rehearing and Writ of Certiorari
11.

The Association filed a Petition for Rehearing, requesting that this Court

reconsider its holding that the Well Lease was not unconscionable. (Appellee and CrossAppellant's Petition for Rehearing, dated April 10, 2008.) The Association's Petition for
Rehearing was ultimately denied by this Court.
12.

The Dansies did not file a Petition for Rehearing.

13.

Both parties filed Petitions for Writ of Certiorari with the Utah Supreme

Court. (Appellate Docket Number 20080538.) The Utah Supreme Court denied both
Petitions. (R. Vol. 15, p. 1972.)
14.

Following the Utah Supreme Court's denial of the Petitions, this Court

remitted the case to the district court. (R. Vol. 15, p. 1988-89.)

5
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District Court's Order Denying Motion to Modify Final Judgment
15.

Upon remittitur, the Dansies filed a Motion to Modify Final Judgment with

the district court. (R. Vol. 15, p. 2000-01.)
16.

The Dansies argued that, based upon paragraph 12 and footnote 2 of this

Court's opinion, the district court should significantly modify the findings and
conclusions of the Final Judgment. (R. Vol. 15, p. 2003-09.)
17.

The district court denied the Dansies' motion to modify the Final Judgment.

(R.Vol. 15, p. 2082-87.)
18.

In the Order Denying Motion to Modify Final Judgment, the district court

noted that there was "no ambiguity whatsoever" in this Court's language that it had
affirmed the Final Judgment on all issues and that the Dansies' request "would result in a
very different trial court order than the one the Court of Appeals affirmed." The district
court concluded that it did not have the authority "to interpret the opinion so broadly in
the face of the unequivocal affirmance." (R. Vol. 15, p. 2086.)
19.

The Dansies filed a Notice of Appeal, seeking review of the district court's

Order Denying Motion to Modify Final Judgment. (R. Vol. 15, p. 2097-98.)

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The district court properly denied the Dansies' motion to modify the Final
Judgment. The district court correctly held that it lacked the power to modify the Final
Judgment, which had been affirmed on all issues by this Court. This Court's unequivocal
affirmance of the Final Judgment precluded further review by the district court, and the

6
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district court had only the power to enforce the Final Judgment as affirmed. Furthermore,
even if the Dansies' motion to modify had been treated as a motion to reconsider, it
would still have been properly denied by the district court.

Additionally, any

modification of the Final Judgment would have violated the mandate rule. For these
reasons, this Court should affirm the district court's Order Denying Motion to Modify
Final Judgment.
This Court should not recall its mandate and modify its prior opinion. This Court
cannot recall its mandate because no Utah rule of procedure allows a recall of mandate
and because no Utah appellate court has ever held that it has the "inherent power" to
recall a mandate. But even if the Court does have the power to recall a mandate, this case
is devoid of any exceptional circumstances that warrant the extraordinary relief requested
by the Dansies.

The Dansies had plenty of opportunity to utilize the rehearing or

certiorari procedures to raise any alleged inconsistencies in this Court's prior opinion, but
they failed to do so. Additionally, there is no manifest injustice to be avoided in this case
because the Dansies will be in the same position regardless of whether or not this Court
recalls its mandate and modifies its prior opinion. Accordingly, this Court should deny
the Dansies' request that the Court recall its mandate.

7
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ARGUMENT
I. THIS COURT SHOULD AFFIRM THE DISTRICT COURT'S DENIAL OF THE
MOTION TO MODIFY THE FINAL JUDGMENT.
The Dansies attempt to turn this latest appeal into something that it is not. This is
an appeal of the district court's Order Denying Motion to Modify Final Judgment. See
Notice of Appeal (R. Vol. 15, p. 2097-98) (stating that the Dansies "hereby appeal[] to
the Court of Appeals from the Order Denying Motion to Modify Final Judgment signed
by the Honorable Stephen Roth . . . on April 21, 2009"). Nevertheless, the Dansies
dedicate only one paragraph of their brief {see Brief of Appellants, pages 11-12) to the
true issue of this appeal, i.e., whether the district court was correct in denying the
Dansies' motion to modify the Final Judgment. The Dansies use the remainder of their
brief to, in essence, attempt to re-appeal this Court's prior opinion. The Court should not
take the bait. Instead, it should limit its review to the Order denying the Dansies' motion
to modify and resist the Dansies' urgings to "redo" a prior appellate decision.
As discussed below, the district court's denial of the Dansies' motion to modify
was correct. The district court properly held that it lacked authority to modify the Final
Judgment in the face of this Court's unequivocal affirmance on all issues. But even if the
district court did have authority to modify the Final Judgment, modification would still
have been inappropriate in light of this Court's opinion.

8
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A. The District Court Correctly Held It Lacked Authority to Modify the Final Judgment
Affirmed on Appeal.
The district court concluded that it did not have the authority to modify the Final
Judgment in the face of this Court's "unequivocal affirmance" of the Final Judgment in
the prior appeal. The district court therefore denied the Dansies' motion to modify the
Final Judgment upon remittitur. The district court's holding was correct and is soundly
based on Utah law because (1) this Court's affirmance precluded further review; (2) the
district court had only the power to enforce the Final Judgment as affirmed; (3) even if
the motion to modify had been treated as a motion to reconsider, it would still have been
denied; and (4) modification of the Final Judgment would violate the mandate rule.
First, the district court's holding is in harmony with the Utah Supreme Court's
decision in DeBry v. Cascade Enters., 935 P.2d 499 (Utah 1997). In DeBry, the Utah
Supreme Court had previously affirmed a judgment in favor of the defendants based on
DeBry's failure to pay a promissory note. Id. at 500. On remand to the district court,
DeBry again asked for a setoff and recalculation of interest due on the promissory note.
Id. at 501. The trial court rejected DeBry's motion, and DeBry again appealed to the
Supreme Court. Id. The Supreme Court ruled that the trial court had correctly rejected
DeBry's motion:
[0]n remand . . . the trial court had no authority to modify the
judgment this Court had affirmed, except to the extent
ordered by this Court and in conformity with its mandate. An
unqualified affirmance is a final settlement of the applicable
law; it settles the law of the case and precludes further
appeals on the issues pertaining to that judgment . . . . The
affirmance of a judgment precludes a further attack on that
judgment in a subsequent appeal.
9
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Id, at 502 (internal citations omitted).2
The Supreme Court's holding in DeBry clearly supports the district court's
conclusion in this case that it did not have authority to modify the Final Judgment "in the
face of the unequivocal affirmance."

(R. Vol. 15, p. 2086.)

It also supports the

Association's position that the Dansies should not be permitted to attack the affirmance
in this subsequent appeal. Given the clear and unequivocal affirmance by this Court,
modification of the Final Judgment was not warranted or even permissible.
Second, under Utah law, "[a]n affirmance is the confirmation and ratification by
an appellate court of a judgment, order, or decree of a lower court brought before it for
review." Schoney v. Memorial Estates, Inc., 863 P.2d 59, 61 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).
Indeed, "[f]rom time immemorial, [appellate courts] have adhered to the basic and
elementary rule that. . . affirmance . . . declares that the trial judgment was correct as if
there had been no appeal," and "[u]pon issuance of [the] mandate, the trial court simply
proceeds to enforce the final judgment." Collins v. Acree, 614 So. 2d 391, 392 (Miss.
1993). This Court affirmed the district court's Final Judgment on all issues and did not
express any directions or intent that modification of the Final Judgment was necessary or
appropriate. The district court had only the power to enforce the Final Judgment as
affirmed by this Court. Thus, the district court correctly held that it lacked authority to
modify the Final Judgment.
2

Affirmance precludes attack whether the Court of Appeals panel on the
subsequent appeal is the same or different. See State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1269
(Utah 1993) ("[S]tare decisis has equal application when one panel of a multi-panel
appellate court is faced with a prior decision of a different panel.").
10
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Third, as noted by the district court, if and to the extent the Dansies' motion to
modify could be construed as a motion to reconsider the Final Judgment, such motion
would still have been denied. (See R. Vol. 15, p. 2085-86.) The district court cited to
Gillette v. Price, in which the Utah Supreme Court "absolutely rejected] the practice of
filing postjudgment motions to reconsider," which "are not recognized in either the Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure or the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure." 2006 UT 24,ffif1,
6, 135 P.3d 861. The Gillette court also stated that "[i]n our system, the rules provide the
source of relief available. . . . [and] when a party seeks relief from a judgment, it must
turn to the rules to determine whether relief exists, and if so, direct the court to the
specific relief available." Id. % 8.
The district court's holding on this point is sound. The Dansies5 were unable to
point the district court to any rule under which they were entitled to the relief they
sought, which was a modification of the Final Judgment affirmed by this Court.

The

district court could not, should not, and did not grant the Dansies a disfavored motion that
has no basis in the rules of procedure.
Finally, the district court's denial of the Dansies' motion to modify the Final
Judgment was correct because modifying the Final Judgment would have violated the
mandate rule. Utah courts have "long recognized that branch of the law of the case
doctrine known as the mandate rule." Utah Dep 't ofTransp. v. Ivers, 2009 UT 56, f 12,
218 P.3d 583. "The mandate rule 'dictates that pronouncements of an appellate court on
Similarly, as discussed in Section II.A of this brief, the Dansies are unable to
point to any rule under which they are entitled to the relief they seek from this Court,
which is a recall of mandate and modification of this Court's prior opinion.
11
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legal issues in a case become the law of the case and must be followed in subsequent
proceedings of that case.'" Id. (quoting Thurston v. Box Elder County, 892 P.2d 1034,
1037-38 (Utah 1995)). "The mandate rule . . . binds both the district court and the
parties to honor the mandate of the appellate court."' Id. (quoting IHC Health Servs., Inc.
v. D &KMgrnt., Inc., 2008 UT 73, f 28, 196 P.3d 588). "'Where a judgment or decree is
affirmed or reversed and remanded with directions to enter a particular judgment, the trial
court may not permit amended or supplemental pleadings to be framed to try rights
already settled.'" Id. (quoting Street v. Fourth Judicial Dist. Court, 191 P.2d 153, 158
(Utah 1948)). "The mandate rule is justified. Without it, 'considerable inefficiencies
would result if parties were free to relitigate after remand issues decided in an earlier
ruling of this court.'" Id. Tf 13 (quoting Gildea v. Guardian Title Ins. Co., 2001 UT 75, f
9, 31 P.3d 543). "The rule is also 'not only reasonable, but necessary, if litigation is ever
to come to an end.'" Id. (quoting Street, 191 P.2d at 158); see also Thurston, 892 P.2d at
1039 (stating that the mandate rule "rests on good sense and the desire to protect both
court and parties against the burdens of repeated reargument by indefatigable diehards"
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).
The mandate rule clearly applies. This Court affirmed the Final Judgment on all
issues, and this Court's mandate was binding on the district court upon remittitur. The
Dansies' motion to modify the Final Judgment was an attempt to relitigate issues that had
already been decided and affirmed by this Court. The district court properly rejected the
Dansies' motion to modify in the interest of bringing finality to litigation that has been
ongoing for almost 25 years.
12
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The Dansies, nevertheless, argue that the district court had the right and power to
amend the Final Judgment "in order to prevent manifest injustice." Brief of Appellant,
pages 11-12. As support, the Dansies cite to a Pennsylvania case for the proposition that
"a trial court may deviate from the strict language of a remand in order to prevent a grave
injustice." Brief of Appellant, page 11 (citing In re Estate ofRochez, 606 A.2d 563 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1992)).

The Pennsylvania case is, however, neither controlling nor

persuasive in the present case. In Rochez, the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court issued
a decision that was "premised upon [an] erroneous assumption." 606 A.2d at 565. On
remand, the trial court refused to enforce the decision as written, and the case was again
appealed to the Commonwealth Court. Id. The Commonwealth Court held that the trial
court was correct in refusing to enforce the appellate decision because the decision had
been "based upon palpably erroneous facts." Id, at 566. But in the present case, this
Court's opinion was not based on erroneous assumptions or facts, and there is no
"manifest injustice" to be avoided.4 Thus, the claimed exception to the mandate rule does
not apply. Rather, "the trial court [was] duty bound to strictly comply with the mandates
of this Court." Id. at 566-67.
In sum, the district court's holding that it lacked authority to modify the Final
Judgment was correct. Utah law clearly provides that the district court could not have
modified the Final Judgment, which had been unequivocally affirmed on all issues by this
Court.

The district court had only the authority to enforce the Final Judgment as
4

Section II.B of this brief presents a more detailed analysis of why there is no
"manifest injustice" at play in this case.
13
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affirmed. The district court also correctly noted that even if the motion to modify was
treated as a motion to reconsider, it would still be denied. Finally, the district court's
decision was correct in light of the mandate rule and the strong interest injudicial finality
upon which the mandate rule is founded. For these reasons, this Court should affirm the
district court's denial of the Dansies' motion to modify the Final Judgment.

B. Even If the District Court Had Authority to Modify the Final Judgment, This Court's
Opinion Did Not Support Modification.
Even assuming that the district court somehow had the authority to modify the
final judgment, denial of the motion to modify was correct because this Court's prior
opinion did not support modification.

When looking at the opinion in its totality, it

becomes clear that (1) if this Court had intended to reverse the district court, it would
have done so explicitly; (2) footnote 2 can be—and should be—read consistent with the
affirmance; and (3) even if there is an inconsistency, the mandate governs.
First, notwithstanding this Court's unequivocal affirmance on all issues, the
Dansies assume that this Court intended modification or partial reversal of the Final
Judgment, but mistakenly omitted that intent from its directive. This assumption is not
only speculative, but is untenable given the briefs before this Court and given the opinion
as a whole. The Dansies raised only four issues in the prior appeal, and the very first one
was "[w]hether the trial court erred in holding that although the Well Lease provides that
the Dansies are entitled to 55 water connections and up to 12 million gallons of water per
year without charge, the Dansies must first pay for the connections as well as the
Dansies' pro rata share of the transportation costs."
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See Tab A.

This issue was

extensively briefed in each of the four briefs before this Court and was the first issue
raised by the Dansies' counsel in oral argument. If this Court had intended to reverse or
modify the Final Judgment on this issue, it is reasonable to assume that it would have
explicitly stated that intent in its opinion. But such language is nowhere to be found.
The opinion does not say "affirmed as modified by this opinion."

It does not say

"affirmed in part and reversed in part." Indeed, nowhere in the Opinion does this Court
assign any error to the district court's Final Judgment.
There are significant hazards associated with implying an appellate directive
different from the actual stated directive in an opinion. For example, in Madsen v.
Madsen, 1 P.2d 946 (Utah 1931), the Utah Supreme Court had ruled in an earlier case
that "the judgment will have to be set aside," and that the trial court should "sustain the
special demurrer to the first, second, and third causes of action." Id, at 946. On remand,
the trial court inferred that the opinion "was, in effect, an affirmance of the judgment as
to the fourth cause of action" and awarded the damages for that claim established at the
pre-appellate trial. Id, at 948. On the second appeal, the Utah Supreme Court held that
the words "c[t]he judgment will have to be set aside' . . . can only mean that the judgment
is set aside, vacated, and annulled, and, having been thus swept from existence, the lower
court has no power to breathe into any part of it the breath of life." Id, Similarly, in this
case, this Court "affirm[ed] the trial court on all issues," which can only mean that it did
not reverse or modify the district court's ruling on any issue.
Indeed, the issue of implied appellate directives is fraught with peril. The burdens
of "repeated reargument by indefatigable diehards," Thurston v. Box Elder County, 892
15
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P.2d 1034, 1039 (Utah 1995), are likely to be felt by litigants and courts alike if parties
dissatisfied with their appellate outcomes are allowed to ignore the redress available to
them by petitions for rehearing or certiorari in the appellate courts, and instead wait until
the matter has been remitted to the district court to scour the appellate decision for any
scrap of language that may arguably indicate that the appellate court could not possibly
have meant what it said in the directive.
The issue of whether the district court correctly held that the Dansies were
required to pay the connection fees and their pro rata share of costs was squarely before
this Court. Indeed, it was the foremost issue in the appeal. Had this Court intended to
reverse the district court on this important issue, it would have done so explicitly in its
opinion and/or mandate, and not implicitly through a footnote.
Second, this Court's opinion can be read in a way that there is no inconsistency
between the body of the opinion and the mandate. Throughout their brief, the Dansies
cling to the assumption that there is an inconsistency between footnote 2 and the ultimate
mandate of this Court.5 Nevertheless, the opinion can be—and should be—read in a way
that there is no inconsistency.
A court should be hesitant to conclude that there is an inconsistency and should
make every effort to reconcile the body of the opinion to the directive. See Culbertson v.
Bd. of County Comrn'rs, 2001 UT 108, f 15, 44 P.3d 642 (noting that interpreting court
5

It should be noted that the Dansies took the opposite position before the district
court when they petitioned for a modification of the Final Judgment. See R. 2056
("There is no inconsistency between paragraph 12 and footnote 2, which contain the
reasoning of the Court of Appeals, and its ultimate affirmance of the trial court.").
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judgments is governed "under the rules that apply to other legal documents"); Plateau
Mining Co. v. Utah Div. of State Lands & Forestry, 802 P.2d 720, 725 (Utah 1990)
("Each . . . provision is to be considered in relation to all others."). The Utah Supreme
Court's reversal of the Amax decision illustrates this point. On review of the Court of
Appeals' decision, the Supreme Court explained that there was no inconsistency between
its directive to apply a certain valuation statute and the constitutional principles discussed
in the body of the opinion because the statute itself only applied to property valued in a
certain way. Amax Magnesium Corp. v. Utah State Tax Comm Vz, 874 P.2d 840, 842-43
(Utah 1994). Similarly, footnote 2 can be reconciled with the overall opinion and its
ultimate directive affirming the district court on all issues.
When viewed in concert with the remainder of the opinion, the interpretive
purpose of footnote 2 becomes clear. Footnote 2 occurs within the opinion's discussion
of why the well lease agreement entered into by the parties' predecessors-in-interest
("Well Lease Agreement") is not void as a matter of public policy. Hi-Country Estates
Homeowners Ass% 2008 UT App 105, f 12, 182 P.3d 417. This Court held that the
Utah Public Service Commission's ("PSC") lack of "current" jurisdiction over the
Association rendered a 1986 PSC Order and the statutes governing public utilities
insufficient to invalidate the Well Lease Agreement on public policy grounds. Id. After
discussing the public policy argument, this Court proceeded to discuss the issue of
unconscionability.

Id. ^ j 14-20.

Footnote 2 established that, for purposes of the

unconscionability discussion to follow, the Court of Appeals would "interpret the
Dansies' rights and obligations under the Well Lease according to its plain language." Id.
17
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Tf 12 n.2 (emphasis added). This Court was saying, in essence, that it would not assess
the issues of public policy and unconscionability based on the Well Lease Agreement as
modified by the 1986 PSC Order, but would assess these issues based on the unmodified
Well Lease Agreement. This Court did not, however, say that the district court erred in
imposing the conditions that it did, and such an assignment of error should not and cannot
be implied. In sum, paragraph 12 and footnote 2 of this Court's prior opinion can—and
should—be read in a way that is consistent with its mandate that the Final Judgment was
affirmed in its entirety.
Finally, even assuming, arguendo, that footnote 2 is inconsistent with this Court's
affirmance—as alleged by the Dansies—the directive of "affirmed on all issues" governs.
This Court has held that "[w]here the language used in the body of an appellate opinion
conflicts with directions on remand, the latter controls." Amax Magnesium Corp. v. Utah
State Tax Comrn'n, 848 P.2d 715, 718 (Utah Ct. App. 1993), rev'd on other grounds 874
P.2d 840 (Utah 1994). This rule is sensible as it is much less likely that an error would
be made by an author and missed by a panel of reviewing judges in the ultimate directive
of an opinion than in the body of that opinion. Thus, if a directive is an unequivocal
affirmance on all issues, the directive governs over any language in the opinion that could
be construed by a party as a partial reversal.
But contrary to this Court's holding in Amax, the Dansies cite a Missouri case in
support of their claim that a trial court can exceed the scope of the mandate. Brief of
Appellant, page 12 (citing Frost v. Liberty Mut Ins. Co., 813 S.W.2d 302 (Mo. 1991)).
That case is not only contrary to the Utah law discussed above, but it is also
18
4844-1230-874 l:HI088-002

distinguishable from this case. In Frost, the Missouri Court of Appeals remanded a case
with an incomplete directive. 813 S.W.2d at 304. In its opinion, the Court of Appeals
held that the trial court should have granted both a motion to intervene and a motion to
vacate the judgment. Id. 304. The final paragraph of the opinion, however, directed the
trial court to grant only the motion to intervene. Id. When the case was remitted, the trial
court granted the motion to intervene and the motion to vacate the judgment. Id. at 30304. The case was appealed to the Missouri Supreme Court, with the appellant arguing
that the trial court exceeded the Court of Appeals' mandate. Id. at 304. The Missouri
Supreme Court held, however, that the final mandate was merely incomplete and that the
entire mandate could be found within the opinion. Id. at 304-05. Thus, the trial court had
correctly granted both motions. Id. In the present case, the Dansies do not allege that
this Court's mandate of "affirmed on all issues" is incomplete. Rather, the Dansies argue
that the mandate is an outright error and is wholly contradictory to the language of the
opinion. Thus, this is not a case of an incomplete mandate, and the language of Frost
does not apply.
In sum, even assuming that the district court did have the authority to modify the
final judgment, the motion to modify should still have been denied because this Court's
opinion did not support modification. Had this Court intended to reverse the district
court, it would have done so explicitly, and not (as alleged by the Dansies) implicitly
through a footnote. Furthermore, there is no inconsistency in the opinion, as footnote 2
can and should be read consistent with the affirmance.

Finally, even if there is an

inconsistency, the mandate affirming on all issues governs. For these reasons, this Court
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should affirm the district court's denial of the Dansies' motion to modify the Final
Judgment.

II. THIS COURT SHOULD NOT RECALL ITS MANDATE.
As mentioned in Section I, the true issue before this Court is whether the district
court correctly denied the Dansies' motion to modify the Final Judgment, and this Court
should limit its review to this issue. Nevertheless, if and to the extent this Court chooses
to entertain the Dansies' request that the Court recall its mandate, this Court should deny
the request. Utah appellate courts have never explicitly held that a recall of mandate is
recognized in Utah and have expressed unwillingness to grant a recall of mandate.
Additionally, even if this Court has the power to recall a mandate, exercising that power
is not justified here because the Dansies have not met the high burden for a recall of
mandate.

A. Utah Courts Have Been Reluctant to Recall a Mandate.
The Dansies cite to cases from other jurisdictions (mostly federal courts) to
support their assertion that this Court can and should recall its mandate. The Dansies do
not cite to any Utah precedent to support their position. Indeed, there is no such support.
There is no rule of procedure that allows a recall of mandate6 and, unlike the courts cited

6

The nonexistence of a Utah rule of procedure permitting a recall of mandate is a
significant distinguishing factor for a case cited in the Dansies' brief, [n People v.
McAfee, the Colorado Court of Appeals' decision to allow a recall of mandate was based
largely on the fact that a Colorado rule of procedure specifically provides for recalls of
mandate. 160 P.3d 277, 279 (Colo. Ct. App. 2007) ("'The Supreme Court, the Court of
20
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in the Dansies' brief, no Utah appellate court has ever specifically held that it has the
"inherent power" to recall a mandate and modify an opinion following remittitur. The
Association's research shows that a recall of a mandate is briefly mentioned in only two
Utah cases, neither of which lend support to the Dansies' arguments.
In Tucker v. State, Tucker appealed a district court's dismissal of his petition for
extraordinary relief 2005 UT App 28, 2005 WL 121439 (unpublished) (attached as Tab
B). This Court reversed and remanded the case with respect to one claim. Id. On
remand, the district court denied this final claim on summary judgment, and Tucker
appealed the district court's decision to this Court. Id. Tucker also filed a "Motion to
Recall of Mandate for Good Cause," wherein he requested this Court to set aside its first
decision. Id. This Court denied the motion, concluding that "we lack jurisdiction to set
aside our previous decision and do not consider the motion filed in this appeal from a
completely separate decision." Id.
The other case, State v. Lara, 2005 UT 70, 124 P.3d 243, dealt with a recall of a
remittitur, which is arguably similar to a recall of a mandate. As part of its discussion,
the Utah Supreme Court noted its reluctance to grant motions to recall a remittitur or a
mandate:
The narrow reading of the traditionally recognized grounds
for recalling a remittitur and the reluctance by courts to apply
them can be traced to the desire to discourage parties
disappointed with the outcome of appeals from mounting
attempts to undo a result long after a decision is handed
down. Thus . . . an appellate court is without power to recall
Appeals, or a justice or judge thereon may upon just terms stay the issuance of, or recall,
any mandate of the Court of Appeals
'" (quoting Colo. App. R. 41.1)).
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a mandate for the purpose of reexamining the cause on the
merits, or to correct judicial error. We do not take issue with
this statement of law. Indeed, a concern fundamental to our
decisions in cases in which a defendant appeals after being
barred from walking into the appellate court's front door is
the fear that by penetrating the court's walls with too many
side and back doors we may compromise the finality so
essential to the integrity of the judicial process and lead
appellate courts to overstep their jurisdiction.
Id. f 19 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). Ultimately, the Supreme Court
held that a recall of the remittitur was proper in that case, but only because of the
"important constitutional guarantees" (a criminal defendant's right to appeal) that were at
risk if the remittitur was not recalled. Id. ^ 19, 34.
Tucker and Lara clearly demonstrate that Utah appellate courts are averse to
recalling a mandate except under the most limited circumstances. Unlike the Lara case,
this case presents no important constitutional guarantees that override the general rule
that appellate courts should not recall a mandate. Indeed, recalling the mandate in this
case would be a realization of the Lara court's warning against opening up an appellate
court's "back door" to litigants and "compromise[ing] the finality so essential to the
integrity of the judicial process." Id. ^f 19.
If the Dansies had any doubts or confusions about this Court's opinion when it
was issued almost two years ago, they had two distinct "front doors" available to them
under the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. First, they could have filed a Petition for
Rehearing to raise the issue to this Court (just as the Association did with respect to the
Court's decision regarding the issue of unconscionability). Nevertheless, the Dansies
chose not to do so, thereby leaving this Court unaware of the issue. Second, the Dansies
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could have raised the issue in their Petition for Writ of Certiorari. Again, they elected not
to do so, thereby leaving the Utah Supreme Court unaware of the issue.
Now, after failing to take advantage of the "front door" rehearing and certiorari
procedures, the Dansies are trying to enter this court through a "back door" request for a
recall of mandate. The Dansies offer no explanation for why they should be allowed
through the back door when they totally disregarded the wide-open front doors available
to them. This Court should therefore follow its own precedent and the precedent of the
Utah Supreme Court, and deny the Dansies' request for a recall of mandate.

B. This Case Does Not Meet the High Burden to Recall a Mandate.
As noted above, no appellate court in Utah has ever held that it has the "inherent
power" to recall a mandate and modify an opinion following remittitur. Even assuming
that this Court has the power to recall a mandate, the Dansies must still meet the high
burden for such an extraordinary remedy. The Dansies do not meet this burden because
there are no exceptional circumstances or grave injustice in this case.
As the Dansies acknowledge in their brief, courts that have recognized the power
to recall a mandate repeatedly stress that it is a power that should be used only in the
most exceptional of circumstances. See Brief of Appellants, page 14. The cases cited in
the Dansies' brief are replete with limiting language. See, e.g., Bryant v. Ford Motor
Co., 886 R2d 1526, 1529 (9th Cir. 1989) ("The power of a Court of Appeals to recall its
mandate should be exercised in exceptional circumstances, such as to protect the integrity
of its own processes, to prevent injustice, or for other good cause."); Am. Iron & Steel

23

Inst, v. EPA, 560 F.2d 589, 594 (3d Cir. 1977) (stating that a recall of mandate is "an
extraordinary remedy" that should be "used sparingly" for "good cause, to prevent
injustice, or in special circumstances," and that a court's discretion to recall a mandate
should be used "only in unusual instances" (internal footnotes and quotation marks
omitted)); Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 463 F.2d 268, 278 (D.C. Cir. 1971)
("There must be a special reason, exceptional circumstances, in order to override the
strong policy of repose, that there be an end to litigation." (internal quotation marks
omitted)); People v. McAfee, 160 P.3d 277, 280 (Colo. Ct. App. 2007) ("[T]he power of
an appellate court to alter its earlier judgment at this stage of the proceedings is limited to
a showing of exceptional circumstances." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Indeed, courts have held that finality of litigation is of such critical importance that
mandates should not be recalled even if a court's decision is later determined to be
wrong. See, e.g., Powers v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 483 F.2d 963, 964 (1st Cir. 1973) ("If
we were in error . . . we believe it would be far greater error to permit reconsideration
now after denial of petitions for rehearing and certiorari. There must be an end to
dispute." (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); Greater Boston Television
Corp. 463 F.2d at 277 (stating that the power to recall mandates should not be used to
change decisions "even assuming the court becomes doubtful of the wisdom of the
decision that has been entered and become final"); State v. Lara, 2005 UT 70, f 19, 124
P.3d 243 ("[A]n appellate court is without power to recall a mandate for the purpose of
reexamining the cause on the merits, or to correct judicial error.").
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The Dansies do not meet the high burden for a recall of mandate. They offer no
explanation for their failure to seek review through the normal rehearing or certiorari
procedures. It appears, however, that only two possible explanations exist. The first
possible explanation is that the Dansies and their attorneys deliberately chose to not raise
the issue on rehearing or certiorari. The second possible explanation is that the Dansies
and their experienced and seasoned attorneys failed to recognize the issue until the time
for rehearing and certiorari had passed. Neither of these possible explanations should be
considered "exceptional circumstances."
If the Dansies deliberately failed to raise the issue on rehearing and certiorari, then
they should not be allowed to now raise the issue through such an extraordinary remedy.
The Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure provide rehearing and certiorari procedures to
allow parties to seek redress at the appropriate time and stage of the case. Ignoring
explicit procedural avenues for review in favor of a remedy that has never before been
granted by a Utah court amounts to questionable legal strategy, not "exceptional
circumstances."
Likewise, if the Dansies and their attorneys failed to recognize the issue before the
case was remitted to the district court, such inattentiveness should not constitute
"exceptional circumstances." Utah case law is replete with cases in which parties lose
cases and are saddled with significant costs due to the error or neglect of the parties or
their attorneys: appeals are dismissed for failure to file a timely notice of appeal, see, e.g.,
Henshaw v. Estate of King, 2007 UT 378,ffi[18-19, 173 P.3d 876; claims are disallowed
for failure to follow statutory procedures, such as the notice of claim provisions under the
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Governmental Immunity Act, see, e.g., Heideman v. Washington City, 2007 UT App 11,
\ 14, 155 P.3d 900; claims are dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies,
see, e.g., Patterson v. Am. Fork City, 2003 UT 7, f 21, 67 P.3d 466; and judgments are
entered and enforced due to an attorney's neglect or negligence in responding to
pleadings, see, e.g., Stevens v. LaVerkin City, 2008 UT App 129, ffif 26-32, 183 P.3d
1059. Any alleged monetary effect to the Dansies caused by their own negligence or the
negligence of their attorneys to recognize the issue and utilize rehearing or certiorari
procedures is not an exceptional circumstance that justifies the unprecedented remedy the
Dansies now seek.
Nevertheless, the Dansies allege that "[a] great injustice will be done to [the
Dansies] unless the mandate of this Court is recalled" and the opinion is modified. Brief
of Appellants, page 15. In essence, the Dansies aver that their having to pay the
connection fees and their pro rata share of costs of providing water are the "exceptional
circumstances" justifying a recall of mandate. This is not the case, however, because the
Dansies' paying their pro rata share of costs for water is far from unjust and, indeed, is
inevitable as a result of the laws governing public utilities.
The district court's Final Judgment was based, in part, on a 1986 order of the PSC
that construed the Well Lease Agreement as it related to the rates paid by Association
members ("1986 PSC Order").

(R. Vol. 12, p. 1078-117.) The 1986 PSC Order was

extremely critical of the Well Lease. See, e.g., R. Vol. 12, p. 1088 (noting that the Well
Lease Agreement was "grossly unreasonable, requiring not only substantial monthly
payments, but also showering virtually limitless benefits on [the Dansies]"). The PSC
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found that it was "unjust and unreasonable" to expect the Association's members to bear
the entire burden of the Well Lease Agreement. (R. Vol. 12, p. 1091.) The PSC ordered
that if the Dansies wanted to receive their water, they would have to pay "the actual, prorata (not incremental) costs for power, chlorination and water testing involved in
delivering that water." (R. Vol. 12, p. 1092.) The purpose and effect of the 1986 PSC
Order "was to prohibit the [Well Lease Agreement] from affecting the rates paid by [the
Association]," which was "clearly within the PSC's rate-making authority." Hi-Country
Estates Homeowners Ass 'n v. Bagley & Co., 901 P.2d 1017, 1023 (Utah 1995).
The Association offered on several occasions to supply water to the Dansies,
provided that the Dansies pay their proportional costs, as provided in the 1986 PSC
Order, but the Dansies refused to do so. (R. Vol. 14, p. 1767.) In 1994, the Association
was forced to discontinue supplying water to the Dansies in order to comply with the
1986 PSC Order. (Id.) In 1996, the PSC concluded that the Association was exempt
from PSC regulation because, as a result of the 1994 disconnection, the Association was
providing water to only its members and a few others paying the same rates as its
members. (R. Vol. 12, p. 1119-21.) Accordingly, the PSC cancelled the Association's
certificate of convenience and necessity.

(Id.)

In the Final Judgment, the district court upheld the Well Lease Agreement and
concluded that the Agreement was not void as against public policy. (R. Vol. 14, p.
7

Private water corporations often seek an exemption from PSC regulation to avoid
the expense of formal administrative tariff (i.e., rate) proceedings. The hallmark of
whether an exemption is warranted is whether "each member enjoys a complete
commonality of interest, as a consumer, such that rate regulation would be superfluous."
Utah Admin. Code r. 746-331-l(C).
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1766.) But the district court also imposed the conditions that were part of the 1986 PSC
Order (i.e., that the Dansies were required to pay their pro rata shares of costs and their
connection fees). This decision was based on the district court's prior conclusion that if
the Association were to provide water to the Dansies, the Association would no longer
qualify for PSC exemption, and the Association would again be subject to the 1986 PSC
Order. In a Memorandum Decision and Order dated November 5, 2001, the district court
held as follows:
The decertification of The Association as a public water
company was a result of the fact that if a water company is
owned by all its members . . . then it is no longer subject to
the Public Service Commission regulation. . . .
If The
Association were to provide water to the Dansies, who are not
members of The Association and will not pay rates equal to
that paid by members of The Association, it would no longer
qualify for the exemptions [from PSC regulation] . . . and
would then be subject to the Public Service Commission
jurisdiction and its Order of March 17, 1986. (R. Vol. 11, p.
715.)
Thus, the district court had already concluded that if the Association were to begin
providing water to the Dansies, the PSC would again have jurisdiction over the
Association and the conditions of the 1986 PSC Order would again apply to the Dansies.
The district court was therefore justified in imposing these conditions as part of the Final
Judgment.
Similarly, if this Court were to modify its opinion and hold that the Dansies are
entitled to free connections and water under the Well Lease Agreement, and if the
Dansies connect their water system to the Association's water system to receive their free
water, the Association will once again become subject to PSC regulation, and the 1986
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PSC Order will again impose the payment conditions upon the Dansies. The Dansies
would, therefore, be in the same position as they are now, which is that they are entitled
to water and connections only if they pay their fair share. Thus, because the Dansies will
be in the same position whether or not this Court modifies its prior opinion, there are no
"exceptional circumstances" that necessitate or justify the Court to recall its mandate and
modify its opinion.
In sum, it is doubtful whether this Court has the inherent power to recall a
mandate, as no Utah appellate court has ever held that it does. But even if the Court does
have the power to recall a mandate, this case is devoid of any exceptional circumstances
that warrant the extraordinary relief requested by the Dansies. The Dansies had plenty of
opportunity to raise the issue through the rehearing or certiorari procedures, but failed to
do so. They now seek to enter the courtroom through an unprecedented back door and to
disrupt the finality afforded by this Court's prior decision. Additionally, the Dansies will
have to pay for the connection fees, transportation costs, and other costs—as provided in
the 1986 PSC Order and the Final Judgment—even if this Court recalls its mandate and
modifies its prior opinion. Thus, exceptional circumstances do not exist, and this Court
should deny the Dansies' request that the Court recall its mandate.

CONCLUSION
The district court properly denied the Dansies' motion to modify the Final
Judgment because the district court lacked authority to modify the Final Judgment in the
face of this Court's unequivocal affirmance. Additionally, the mandate rule precluded
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the district court from modifying the Final Judgment as affirmed.

Accordingly, this

Court should affirm the district court's Order Denying Motion to Modify Final Judgment.
This Court cannot recall its mandate and modify its prior opinion because it lacks
the authority to do so. But even if the Court does have the power to recall a mandate, this
case does not present the exceptional circumstances that would be necessary to grant such
an extraordinary relief. Accordingly, this Court should deny the Dansies' request that the
Court recall its mandate.

Dated this 7th day of December, 2009.
SMITH HARTVIGSEN, PLLC

mith \ k MatthewlBrJcn^en
Jeffry R. Gittins
Attorneys for Appellee
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Tucker v. State, 2005 UT App 28, 2005 WL 121439 (unpublished).

32

Tab A

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
HI-COUNTRY ESTATES HOMEOWNERS
ASSOCIATION, a Utah Corporation,,

Utah Appellate Court Case No. 20060139
Third District Court No. 020107452

Plaintiff,
vs.
BAGLEY & COMPANY, a Utah corporation, J.
RODNEY DANSIE, and GERALD BAGLEY,
Defendants,
FOOTHILLS WATER COMPANY, a Utah!
corporation, J. RODNEY DANSIE,
THE DANSIE FAMILY TRUST, RICHARD PJ
DANSIE, BOYD W. DANSIE, JOYCE M.|
TAYLOR and BONNIE R. PARKIN,
Counterclaimants and Appellants,
vs.
HI-COUNTRY ESTATES HOMEOWNERS]
ASSOCIATION, a Utah Corporation, et al.,
Counterclaim Defendants and Appellee.

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS FOOTHILLS WATER COMPANY, J. RODNEY DANSIE,
THE DANSIE FAMILY TRUST, RICHARD P. DANSIE, BOYD W. DANSIE, JOYCE M.
TAYLOR AND BONNIE PARKER

DOUGLAS J. PARRY (2531)
DALE F. GARDINER (1147)
JENNIE B. GARNER (5486)
PARRY, ANDERSON & GARDINER
Attorneys for Appellee/Cross-Appellant
60 East South Temple, Suite 1200
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801)521-3434

927959 5

RAYMOND J. ETCHEVERRY (1010)
ANGIE NELSON (8143)
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER
Attorneys for Appellants/Cross-Appellees
201 South Main St., Suite 1800
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0898
Telephone: (801)532-1234

I.

LIST OF PARTIES
The Appellants/Cross-Appellees are Foothills Water Company, J Rodney Dansie, The

Dansie Family Trust, Richard P Dansie, Boyd W Dansie, Joyce ML Taylor and Bonnie Parkin
(collectively "Appellants" or "the Dansies") These parties were the counterclaimants below
The

Appellee/Cross-Appellant

is

Hi-Country

Estates

Homeowners

Association

("Appellee" or "the Association"), the plaintiff and counterclaim defendant below
Bagley & Company and Gerald Bagley, the defendants below, are no longer parties to
this action
II.

JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction exists pursuant to Utah Code Ann § 78-2a-3(2)(j)

III.

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Issue No 1:
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48P.3d918
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PER CURIAM:
Jeff Tucker appeals a summary judgment disposing of his petition
for extraordinary relief. In the original appeal from the dismissal of
the petition, we reversed and remanded only insofar as the district
court dismissed a claim that the parole revocation hearing was
unreasonably delayed without good cause. See Tucker v. State, 2003 UT
App 213. Tucker now seeks to appeal from the summary judgment order
denying that remaining claim on its merits. This appeal is before the
court on a sua spontQ motion for summary dismissal.

The district court entered a ruling granting the State's summary
judgment motion on March 30, 2004. Tucker filed an "Inquiry and Request
for Clarification" on April 13, 2004, also requesting the district
court to "toll" the time for appeal. Tucker filed his "Notice of Appeal
With Memorandum in Support of Untimely Filing" on September 21, 2004,
requesting the district court to accept the notice of appeal as timely.
However, Tucker did not file a timely motion to extend the time for
appeal under rule 4(e) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. See
Utah R. App. P. 4(e) (allowing motion to extend to be filed in district
court within thirty days after expiration of the original thirty-day
appeal period). The request for clarification was not a motion tolling
the time for appeal under rule 4(b) of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure.
A notice of appeal must "be filed with the clerk of the trial court
within thirty days after the date of entry of the judgment or order
appealed." Utah R. App. P. 4(a). "If an appeal is not timely filed,
this court lacks jurisdiction to hear the appeal." Serrato v. Utah
Transit Auth., 2000 UT App 299,17, 13 P.3d 616. The only means to
extend the time for appeal is through a timely motion filed in the
district court under rule 4(e). The request to accept the untimely
notice of appeal, which was filed almost five months after expiration
of the time to file an appeal, was not timely under rule 4(e). Although
an appellate court may review the trial court's determination of a
timely rule 4(e) motion, it cannot consider a claim of good cause or
excusable neglect in the first instance as a basis to exercise
jurisdiction over an untimely appeal. See Utah R. App. P. 2 (precluding
appellate courts from suspending or modifying rule 4(e)); see generally
Reisbeck v. HCA Health Serv., 2000 UT 48, 2 P.3d 447 (reviewing
decision on rule 4(e) motion).
Tucker also filed a "Motion for Recall of Mandate for Good Cause,"
which requests this court to set aside its decision on his original
appeal in Case No. 20020191-CA. That case was resolved by our
memorandum decision issued on June 26, 2003, see Tucker v. State, 2003
UT App 213, and this court denied a petition for rehearing on July 25,
2003. We lack jurisdiction to set aside our previous decision and do
not consider the motion filed in this appeal from a completely separate
decision.
Once this court determines that it lacks jurisdiction over an
appeal, "we retain only the authority to dismiss the action." VarianEimac, Inc. v. Lamoreaux, 767 P.2d 569, 570 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. We also
deny the "Motion for Recall of Mandate for Good Cause Shown."

Judith M. Billings,
Presiding Judge

Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge

William A, Thorne Jr., Judge

